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The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is using all avenues to include 
nuclear capability for its regime survival, which is threatening the peace within the 
Northeast Asia region. The DPRK is perceived as an outcast by the international 
community and has few means to legitimize its regime other than acts of terrorism and an 
illicit economy that sustains regime survival despite international sanctions. Past 
economic policies and reforms have failed with major social consequences. Continued 
economic downfall will lead to instability of the regime, causing international disorder 
and suffering to DPRK citizens. A strong economy is a major factor in maintaining 
stability within a state, and if citizens are able to meet their basic needs, elites are in 
better positions to maintain their power. The DPRK, as a hard-line authoritarian regime, 
instead maintains power through repression and an informal economy. The fall of the 
Soviet Union, the DPRK’s biggest donor, led to a halt in foreign aid. To make matters 
worse, monsoon events and mismanagement of the economy led to deadly famines. For 
the sake of the regime’s survival and regional stability, the DPRK has to change its 
perspective on its economic policies. 
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The death of its beloved leader, Kim Jong-il, of a massive heart attack on 17 
December 2011 was marked as a tragic day in the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea (DPRK). The day also meant a transition in leadership to Kim Jong-il’s son, Kim 
Jong-un, who took on the challenge of leading a destitute, pariah state after less than two 
years of tutelage under his father. Kim Jong-un has faced a steep curve in bringing an 
orderly transition as many competing factions jockey for positions. Fortunately for him, 
Kim Jung-un has been insulated by his family connections within the inner circle.1  
As a hard-line authoritarian regime, the DPRK maintains power through 
repression. The DPRK plays the nuclear card for regime survival, which adds to the 
instability within the region. The regime is portrayed as an outcast by the international 
community, which has few means to legitimize the regime, and resorts to an illicit 
economy to sustain the state’s survival, partly to circumvent the restrictions imposed by 
the international sanctions. The DPRK has been so dependent upon the Soviet Union and 
China for resources that it has not fully developed its own capabilities. The republic’s 
continued economic decline will only lead to instability of the regime, causing 
international disorder and suffering of its citizens.  
A strong economy is a major factor in maintaining stability within a country. If 
citizens are able to fulfill their basic needs, politicians are in better positions to maintain 
their power. The mismanagement of the economy and ill weather led to deadly famines. 
For the sake of the regime survival and regional stability, the DPRK needs to make 
substantial changes to its economy. Although, there are no easy ways to rectify DPRK’s 
economic troubles, there are enough proven data points in history to provide the  
 
 
                                                 
1 Andrei Lankov, The Real North Korea: Life and Politics in the Failed Stalinist Utopia (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2013), 133–136. 
 2 
guidelines to salvage the DPRK’s future. The experimentation in economic policies that 
brought success to both the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Taiwan will be critical to the 
DPRK’s economic success.  
The biggest question is this: How will the DPRK be able to persuade all of the 
stakeholders in implementing policies that go directly against its ideology? China’s 
transition to an open-market economy may become a model for the DPRK’s attempt to 
obtain reassurance from the inner circle and their citizens. The DPRK will have to 
gradually transition from state-owned enterprises to privately owned enterprises and put 
more emphasis on existing special economic zones (SEZ). Finally, the DPRK will have 
to focus on agricultural policy changes before heavy industries along with limiting free 
speech and communication to make the transition successful. 
Past economic policies and reforms failed with major social consequences, but 
economic policy changes from 2002 suggest that some tweaking of past reforms will 
highly benefit the DPRK. The positive trend has not been fully realized due to the lag 
time in the execution of the changed economic policies.2  
The DPRK has the capability and potential to transform from its current state. It is 
a republic rich in minerals and resources. In fact, Goldman Sachs reported that the 
mineral resources’ financial potential is 140 times the size of the DPRK’s current global 
domestic product (GDP).3 With optimal policies in effect and guidance from the 
international community, the DPRK can navigate challenges to become a successful 
growth story in East Asia.  
In the short term, the DPRK will be able to survive by means of its illicit 
economy, but for the sake of long-term regime sustainability, new economic reforms are 
vital and necessary. The DPRK will have to pursue near-term pain for the sake of long- 
 
                                                 
2 Bruce Cumings, “Why Did So Many Influential Americans Think North Korea Would Collapse?” 
(London: McFarland., 2011), 55. 
3 Goohoon Kwon, A United Korea: Reassessing North Korea Risks (Part 1), Global Economics Paper 
No: 188 (New York: Goldman Sachs, 2009), 10.  
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term prosperity. The DPRK’s success is in the best interest of all countries taking part in 
the Six-Party Talks. Direct or indirect aid by the international community will be critical 
to the DPRK’s success. 
B. IMPORTANCE 
The DPRK not only has become a headache to the United States, the ROK, and 
Japan, but also has become a burden to its close allies; China and Russia. The Six-Party 
Talks have come and gone without any meaningful results. The United Nations’ (UN) 
strangulation strategy of implementing sanctions strictly pertaining to the DPRK’s 
economy has not reined in the defiant state from committing illicit activities. The DPRK 
has produced nuclear weapons to legitimize its regime not only to its citizens, but the 
international community.  
With the DPRK progressing every day in advancing its nuclear program, it is 
urgent and necessary for the international community to find an unorthodox approach to 
bring stability to the Korean Peninsula. In the past, the DPRK has implemented half-
hearted economic reforms with total failure due to illogical decisions rendered by the 
leadership.4 The economic reforms were difficult to implement because of the DPRK’s 
founding ideology of juche and its political and social structures. Depending on the 
economic conditions, the DPRK has oscillated between socialist policies and minor 
attempts at an open-market economy.5  
With the implementation of the UN sanctions and international community’s 
disapproval of DPRK’s illogical actions, the regime has transitioned from a formal 
economy to an illicit economy. The longer the international community shuns the DPRK; 
the longer the regime will become only more defiant with more nuclear weapons on-
hand. It is prudent and vital for the international leadership to both directly and indirectly 
support the DPRK’s attempt at economic reform, which can potentially transition the 
regime to more economic transactions that are lawful. Once efficient and legitimate 
                                                 
4 Cumings, “Why Did So Many… ?” 48–49. 
5 Victor Cha, The Impossible State: North Korea, Past and Future (New York: HarperCollins, 2012), 
37–38. 
 4 
economic structures are in place, the market force will act naturally. A successful 
economic reform will bring legitimacy to the regime and a means for long-term 
survivability. Regime survivability is critical to the international community because 
maintaining the status quo which is in-line with most of the interested party’s strategy. 
The stability of the regime will force the state to act in a diplomatic fashion without the 
need to flex its muscles through nuclear weapons. The regime will be able to continue its 
existence with more legitimacy, and the international community will avoid constant 
headaches in the future. Despite some failures from the DPRK’s attempt at economic 
reform in 2002, the DPRK should continue and tweak its policies because it is currently 
reaping some of the benefits from the past attempt.6  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. The Regime Will Not Collapse 
The exact state of the DPRK is misunderstood by the majority of the analysts who 
follow the ostracized state. Many analysts have predicted that the regime would collapse, 
but it has proven them wrong every time. Bruce Cuming argues that the DPRK will not 
collapse, and asks the question: How has the DPRK has been able to survive while other 
similar regimes have fallen?7  
This is a great question, and one should acknowledge the DPRK’s ability to 
survive even in light of two leadership changes, failed economic reforms, natural 
disasters, and the loss of major donors. It is important to note that even through these 
transitions and difficult times, the regime has still been able to function and make great 
leaps with its nuclear technology. The DPRK has been able to adjust its ideology along 
the way to cater toward any significant event that went against its interests. By keeping 
outside information from the public, the regime has been successful in coercing and 
maintaining its power.  
                                                 
6 Alexandre Mansourov, Emergence of the Second Republic: The Kim Regime Adapts to the Changes 
of Modernity (New York: ME Sharpe, 2005), 47. 
7 Cumings, “Why did So Many…?” 48–49. 
 5 
One thing that has significantly changed is the structure of DPRK’s economy. The 
once prominent state-planned economy has transformed into illicit economy, which now 
accounts for one-third of the annual GDP. 8The North Korean leadership deserves credit 
for endurance over the past six decades.  
There is evidence to support Cuming’s assessment that the regime will not 
collapse anytime soon. Evidence of positive economic data resulting from the 2002 
economic reform will persuade Kim Jung-un to make policy decisions toward a 
meaningful economic reform. Although UN-mandated sanctions have not halted the 
regime’s nuclear development efforts, eventually the sanctions tied directly to its illicit 
activity will strangle its coffers in the long-run. If the DPRK is unable to counter the 
strangulation, it will have no choice but to welcome the reform.9 
2. Historical Economic Trends 
One thing for sure is that the DPRK’s economic situation has had more downs 
than ups. Before and after the Korean War, the DPRK was the dominant economic force 
compared to its southern rival. The Seoul National Unification Board published economic 
data to compare both the North and South Korean economy. The book’s data highlights 
the DPRK’s trading partners and its import and export products.10 It points to the 
DPRK’s heavy reliance on the communist bloc as trading partners and shows the vast 
differences in economic growth between the North and South after the Korean War and 
with the slowing of aid from the Soviet Union. The data suggest that prior to mid-1960s 
that the DPRK was a model economy compared to the ROK. The numbers also show 
paint a picture of a developing economy that started to descend after decrease in 
economic aid from its major donors (Soviet Union and China). The DPRK’s economic 
data are hard to come by so, it is vital to be able to find sources that show enough data 
points to make logical assumptions. The book also addresses ROK’s economic climb and  
 
                                                 
8 Cha, The Impossible State, 129. 
9 Cumings, “Why did So Many …?” 44–47. 
10 South and North Korean Economies (Seoul: National Unification Board, 1987), 8–12. 
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provides the data to show how ROK’s guided economy focused on export-oriented 
policies while providing subsidies to fledgling industries until they had the ability to 
compete in the international market.11 
3. Policy Mistakes 
The DPRK regime made many policy decisions that led to its economic downfall. 
In The Impossible State, Victor Cha provides in-depth analysis on the blunders of the 
DPRK leadership that resulted in a failed economy. Cha takes the mainstream 
conservative approach. The book details five possible reasons for the failure of past 
economic reforms.12 He also explains the correlation between economic conditions and 
who is actually ruling at that time. The book highlights the DPRK resource curse theory 
of relying on too much outside aid in managing the economy. Cha puts great emphasis on 
how ideology drives the DPRK’s regime, a view with which I disagree. Cha also implies 
that there is an end to the regime in the future. He distinguishes the difference between 
Kim Jung-un and his father. This is important because the transition in leadership marks a 
turning point in possible policy changes. Cha asserts that the DPRK is more open to 
information in the way of cell phone usage (restricted in the DPRK, with no access to 
international calls) and Internet usage by foreigners. These types of open communication 
were never possible during Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il’s era. The DPRK has made 
repeated economic reform mistakes, and Cha’s book helps to put into perspective why 
those blunders were made. With new leadership and self-determined initiatives on the 
DPRK’s part to make the reform work, the DPRK will be less likely repeat its mistakes.13 
In the summer of 2002, the DPRK attempted its most drastic economic measures 
in improving its economy.14 Alexandre Mansourov’s article, “Emergence of the Second 
Republic,” paints an optimistic picture of DPRK’s future.15 Mansourov emphasizes that 
                                                 
11Ibid. 
12 Cha, The Impossible State, 110. 
13 Ibid., 110–112. 
14 Mansourov, Emergence of the Second Republic, 47. 
15 Ibid. 
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Kim Il-sung focused on economic reform in the face of a macroeconomic crisis. His 
plans seemed reasonable, but the major problems stemmed from the execution and 
breadth of the changes. Crisis such as hyperinflation and devaluation of the currency had 
major socioeconomic consequences. Mansourov sees a macroeconomic problem in the 
DPRK, but he is confident that the DPRK has the right tools to make economic reform 
successful. Now is the time for Kim Jung-un to continue some of his father’s initiatives 
and learn from past economic reform mistakes.16 
4. The ROK’s Economic Model 
Mansourov mentions that Kim Jong-il was fascinated by the success President 
Park Chung-hee had in turning the ROK’s economy into a so-called “East Asian 
miracle.”17 Stephen Haggard describes the success of the policies in ROK during its 
meteoric economic rise.18 The ROK created an economic committee called the Economic 
Planning Board (EPB) composed of technocrats, bureaucrats, and capitalists who were 
able to plan a way ahead for the fledgling economy. Haggard pinpoints several areas of 
the ROKs success:  
 Creation of institutions that support the planned economic policies is 
critical to the smooth implementation of the objectives and for interaction 
among all the key players;  
 Reliance on comparative advantage to expand export-oriented 
industrialization (EOI);  
 Creation of an environment in which enterprises are driven by incentives 
to increase productivity and efficiency;  
 Taking advantage of backwardness through technology transfers and 
exchange of data;  
 Emphasis on education to promote innovation;  
                                                 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid., 42–44. 
18 Stephan Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery: The Politics of Growth in the Newly 
Industrializing Countries (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), 18–21. 
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 Earning the exchange rate to control inflation and an effort to select, 
shelter, and guide potential winning enterprises to become competitive in 
the international market.19  
These are all areas of weakness in DPRK’s economic structure. If the technocrats, 
Korean Worker’s Party, bureaucrats, capitalists, and Kim Jung-un all support the 
economic policies these areas can help rejuvenate the economic strength and lead to 
economic progress. There are several reasons why the ROK economic model has a better 
chance at assisting the DPRK. The ROK’s economic model fits well because the history 
and culture are similar to DPRK’s. Both countries dealt with authoritarian regimes in the 
past (DPRK, hard-line; ROK, soft). The ROK’s model has proven successful to this day. 
Finally, the ROK would be one of the biggest donors of the DPRK'’s attempt at economic 
reform.20 
5. The Taiwan’s Economic Model 
Another economic model that complements the DPRK’s is Taiwan’s. Yongping 
Wu details Taiwan’s transformation of its political environment and economy from 1950 
to 1985.21 I will use this book to compare Taiwan’s similarity in political structure to 
expand upon the potential economic growth that the DPRK might achieve by following 
parts of Taiwan’s economic policies. Chiang Kai-shek was a leader who wanted to take 
back mainland China after he was forced to take refuge in Taiwan. His stay on the island 
was to be short-term while coming up with a plan to counter-attack. At that time, aid was 
pouring in from the U.S., but Chiang primarily used the aid to build his military. The 
remaining aid was used to restore the economy. As Wu states, the ROC had four 
economic goals to bring life to Taiwan’s economy: restore production, earn foreign 
exchange, maintain defense expenditures, and fight inflation. Taiwan received economic  
 
                                                 
19 Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery,18–21, 23–26. 
20 Ibid., 23–26. 
21 Yongping Wu, A Political Explanation of Economic Growth: State Survival, Bureaucratic Politics, 
and Private Enterprises in the Making of Taiwan’s Economy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005), 
1–3. 
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guidance from the U.S. The policy was to revive the private sector, simultaneously 
building a relationship with the state and large firms. Taiwan focused on shifting to 
exports and upgrading their industrial capabilities.  
This book’s assertions lend credibility to my argument that similar authoritarian 
regimes can indeed succeed in economic reforms with the right policies in place. There 
will be bumps along the way, but Taiwan proves that in the long run, the economic 
reform was a success. Along with the ROK model, Taiwan’s model can help the DPRK’s 
economy. Both regimes were hard line authoritarian regimes. Both governments were 
focused on building their military and reliant on international aid to keep their regimes 
afloat. Finally, Taiwan was in economic shambles before steering its economy to success 
by controlling inflation, creating institutions, building heavy industry along with 
infrastructure, and relying on Taiwan’s economic committee to make centralized policy 
decisions.22  
6. China’s Balancing Act 
The biggest question is how will the DPRK implement its economic reform and 
allow some form of openness to the international community after more than six decades 
of repressive rule. Wang Hui’s book, China’s New Order, is a critical piece in this thesis 
because it suggests that the DPRK regime can emulate the Chinese success in economic 
reform and still maintain power.23 The Chinese model was not part of the East Asian 
miracle, but it is important to view the Chinese model from the perspective of both 
export-oriented objectives and the state’s ability to maintain control over the population, 
while still opening to open-market economy. The critical part is how China was able to 
transition and still maintain its political ideology. The Chinese reform started by 
identifying the weakness within the society—the gap between the rural and the urban 
populations. It is important to address how the public will react to economic reform and 
changes in the DPRK’s policies and ideology. The DPRK has used repression as means 
                                                 
22 Wu, A Political Explanation of Economic Growth, 1–6. 
23 Ibid., 2–3. 
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to crack down on dissident behavior and thrown thousands of dissidents into work camps. 
Without the ability of the DPRK to maintain the same degree of repression while 
pursuing of economic reform, how will the DPRK maneuver through the unchartered 
territory? Hui’s book will enlighten what restrictions are appropriate within state control 
and what is not. The book helps to address the optimum state control to maintain 
economic progress and still be able to have orderly conduct by citizens.24 
7. Economic Potentials 
The DPRK has the potential to succeed with reform and indirect support from the 
international community. Most importantly, Kim Jung-un cannot make the same policy 
mistakes as his father. It is critical for the DPRK to understand its comparative 
advantages and efficiently utilize its assets. Goohoon Kwon shows the long-term growth 
potential of the DPRK.25 Kwon outlines the strengths of the DPRK that can be utilized to 
propel its economy: an abundant and competitive labor force, natural resources, the 
potential of large gains through productivity growth and currency appreciation that are 
normal part of developing country. The DPRK has one of the highest literacy rates in the 
world. If the DPRK takes advantage of its potential human capital and low wages, there 
is plenty room to grow. According to Kwon’s research, the DPRK can use the mineral 
resources as its comparative advantage in export to other countries. In comparing 
transition economies of both Asia and Europe, there was on average 7.3 percent growth 
after economic reforms were in place between1992-2008. Much of the growth came from 
more efficient allocation of resources and better use of existing resources. Also, previous 
transition country data show that the DPRK purchasing power can grow much faster than 
the real GDP. This article will help to find the comparative advantages of the DPRK and 
its potential in operating in the world economy.26  
                                                 
24 Wang Hui, China’s New Order (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), 20–23, 28–31. 
25 Kwon, A United Korea, 13. 
26 Ibid. 
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8. The Way Forward 
The ROK, Taiwan, and the China models are not perfect, and there is no silver 
bullet to the DPRK’s economic problems. The DPRK’s technocrats have to consider its 
current political and social environment and select the most suitable economic policies 
that fit their current situation. Suk Hi Kim offers an overview of some of the possible 
economic reform policies that the DPRK could try.27 Kim puts heavy emphasis on price 
liberalization based on supply and demand versus manipulation of price control, which 
can be hazardous in an open-market economy. Price liberalization can lead to 
improvements in incentives for workers to produce only if it is combined with 
macroeconomic stabilization. Another key element Kim mentions is privatization of 
state-owned enterprises. Kim notes that the DPRK’s GDP has grown 20 percent over the 
last 10 years, which might be a sign emphasizing the importance of revamping the 
existing SEZs. Kim takes a sequential approach over a simultaneous approach in fixing 
the inefficiencies of the SEZs. Of the four SEZs, Kim states that the two ROK-led SEZs 
have the most potential. Kim breaks down three stages for enhancing DPRK economic 
growth. The first stage focuses on labor intensive light industries (comparative advantage 
with low wages and skilled labor force). The second stage approaches technology 
intensive industries such as electricity and machinery. The last stage focuses on high tech 
industries such as IT through technology transfers. Kim emphasizes that the SEZs should 
be utilized in transitioning one stage after another. 28 I definitely agree with Kim that the 
DPRK’s economic reform should proceed in stages. Any simultaneous approach or 
unproven method can result in major failure. The ROK SEZs should be focused on first 
because they have been proven successful and the two Northern SEZs supported by both 
Russia and China have been abandoned. The DPRK met failure with price control back in 
2002. Price liberalization with natural supply and demand is the best course of action.29 
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Young Whan Kihl provides an in-depth look into the DPRK’s economic status 
and perspective. Kihl applauds the regime for taking up economic reform initiatives by 
making adjustments in wages, increase autonomy of enterprises, authorization to 
establish markets, and limited opening to foreign investments, but he also criticizes the 
overall effort in implementing the policies.30 The limited efforts in executing the policies 
have hampered the economic developments of the DPRK. Kihl regards the success of the 
Kaesong Industrial Complex, which was closed down for the first time in its history, 
though recently reopened, as a small milestone in spreading success throughout the 
country. The DPRK has steadily made development in increasing its exports such as 
mineral products to generate foreign exchange to fund other imports. The DPRK has even 
imported aquaculture technology to increase production of cultivated fish. Although these 
developments are minor, they still show that the DPRK is making efforts towards its 
economic policy objectives. The book also highlights the DPRK’s major sources of 
income coming from mostly China and the ROK. The DPRK has to slowly phase out of 
the illicit activities in order to receive aid from the international community. Surprisingly, 
the U.S. has given the DPRK favorable trade nation status under the pseudo “Made in 
South Korea,” name. This allows the DPRK to produce products that are exported to the 
U.S. under the ROKs name. Most importantly, Kihl underscores that all of the countries 
in the Six-Party Talks do not welcome the collapse of the DPRK’s economy and the 
chaos that might follow the disaster. All the participants have some sort of economic ties 
to the DPRK and would rather see the DPRK succeed than falter for their own self-
interests.31 
Patrick McEachern’s book, Inside the Red Box,32 is interesting because it 
addresses almost all aspects of the thesis. McEachern states that the DPRK had no choice 
but to reform economically in the 1990s due to economic conditions resulting from the 
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drastic decrease in Soviet aid and natural disasters that destroyed food production. The 
DPRK also stopped the production distribution system (PDS) when the economy faltered 
and there was not enough food for distribution. On top of that, the DPRK was open to 
market activities to substitute for the stoppage of the PDS. This suggests an indirect 
correlation between economic downturn and the need for economic reform.  
This thesis argues that Chinese can make or break the DPRK based on trade. It 
can be safe to assume that most authoritarian leaders would be open to brokering a deal if 
the regime can continue to exist in exchange for few cards on the deck. Andrei Lankov 
suggests that China does not hold the political leverage to make the DPRK’s decision, but 
it does hold the stick when it comes to the economy.33 My suggestion is for a 
simultaneous approach for the DPRK to pursue economic reform along with a U.S. and 
Chinese with Pyongyang that would legitimize its leadership with international aid to 
propel the DPRK’s economy. A major deal would be dictated by both the U.S. and China 
using their financial leverage to convince Kim Jung-un that his regime would be able to 
stay in power and they would receive economic guidance and aid from the international 
community in turn restricts some nuclear advancement. This deal would be a win-win 
situation for all those that are involved with the Six-Party Talks. Kim would be able to 
maintain his regime with the international support. China would still maintain the DPRK 
as a buffer zone. The U.S. can continue its concentration on China instead of worrying 
about nuclear instability in the Northeast Asia region. China would support since they can 
maintain the DPRK as a buffer state along with keeping the status quo. Japan would no 
longer have to worry about nuclear threats. At last, the ROK does not have to worry 
about absorbing the North if there would ever be a collapse to the regime. History has 
shown that most of the Asian countries that pursued open-market economy eventually 
transitioned into a democratic state. The international community should not force the 
DPRK into a democratic state, but just let time work its magic.34 
Finally, I agree with many of the arguments that Lankov makes of the current and 
past events in the DPRK, but I will argue against Lankov’s dismal view in his book, The 
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Real North Korea: Life and Politics in the Failed Stalinist Utopia, of the DPRK’s 
economic reform. Lankov takes a middle ground approach in analyzing the DPRK.35 He 
highlights the diplomatic tactics that the DPRK has used to sustain the Kim regime. 
Lankov explains that opening up to the international community would mean demise of 
the regime or political suicide based on its ideology. Lankov alludes that there are some 
benefits to engagement with the DPRK by the international community. He provides a 
short- and long-term perspective of what would happen to the regime. He states that 
DPRK is likely to continue for some time, but there is an end in sight. I argue against 
Lankov’s premise that openness will lead to the demise of the regime. Yes, the immediate 
and sudden openness without a transition plan would be a shock to the citizens of DPRK, 
but there are gradual approaches to transition to make the landing less painful. The 
Chinese approach is an option for the DPRK to gradually open up its economy to the 
international community. I will also argue that the DPRK’s regime has every bit of 
seriousness to press for reform with the new leader.36 
D. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis’s main methodology is comparative case studies. It compares similar 
authoritarian regimes, and past economic reforms, and analyzes the end results. The case 
studies focus primarily on East Asian countries such as the ROK, Taiwan, and China. It 
does not assume that all the policies that worked to successfully transform the economies 
of the ROK, Taiwan, and China would be useful for the DPRK. It argues that case-by-
case scenarios offer the possibility of creating a hybrid model that be specifically tailored 
toward the DPRK and its current political, social, and economic environment. Comparing 
the DPRK to the three other countries assessed here provides enough data points to 
establish the likely effects of economic reform and the results.  
                                                 
35 Lankov, The Real North Korea, 109–111.h 
36Ibid. 
 15 
II. THE ROOTS OF PAST ECONOMIC FAILURES 
A. LEARN FROM THE PAST 
Henry Ford was a pioneer who developed and manufactured the Model T 
automobile and founded the Ford Motor Company. Ford was quoted as saying, “failure is 
simply the opportunity to begin again … this time more intelligently.”37 Kim Jong-un’s 
transition to power may be considered a golden opportunity to massage some of the 
economic policies his father envisioned and to not repeat the same mistakes from the 
past. In order to implement economic reforms that are realistic and achievable, past 
attempts—successes and failures—have to be deeply scrutinized. Unfortunately, the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has experienced more of the latter. 
After a successful economic ascent starting after the Korean War, the DPRK began to 
struggle in the late 1970s and notably throughout the 1980s–1990s.38 When the powerful 
Soviet Union fell, it was a crushing financial blow to the DPRK. The DPRK’s attempts at 
economic reforms had resulted in devastating social consequences. The reforms were 
half-hearted and loosely implemented. Some analysts feel that major economic reforms 
would go against the regime’s philosophy because such reforms would require the pariah 
DPRK state to open its arms to the international community.
39
 Opening up to the outside 
world could have critical consequences. Why did the DPRK fail miserably to transform 
its once-viable economy? There are five reasons, according to author Victor Cha:  
1.  Imbalance in concentration of industries,  
2. Conflicting ideology,  
3. Heavy debt, 
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B. IMBALANCE IN THE PORTFOLIO 
The DPRK tried to rebuild its state with assistance from the Soviet Union and 
China after the Korean War. It reaped the benefits of the Japanese Colonialism period 
with the positioning of heavy industries, physical capital, and human capital before the 
war, but U.S. forces destroyed the majority of the DPRK’s heavy industrial complexes 
through aerial assaults. The Soviets granted the DPRK $250 million in aid to help 
recuperate the state after the war.41 The DPRK also received about 
$500 million in aid packages from the Chinese, along with trade agreements with China, 
which accounted for 45 percent of the DPRK’s total trade.42 The Soviets advised dividing 
the $250 million by allocating half to establishing a military and the remaining in equal 
amounts to rebuilding the light and heavy industries.43 There was some logic behind the 
Soviet Union’s recommendation regarding the percentage breakdown of the aid 
allocation, but, Kim Il-sung did not adhere to the advice, deciding to primarily emphasize 
the heavy industry with the intention of rebuilding the fragile economy. Kim failed to 
consider the importance of light industry and the agrarian sector. Unless Kim was able to 
import food from other countries, he risked starving his people by concentrating the 
DPRK’s physical and human capital on the heavy industry only. He put the interest of his 
regime and the crony elites before the DPRK citizens. This obvious imbalance in 
economic focus led to a reliance on more food aid from the Soviet Union and China.
44
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Figure 1.  Loan Distribution from China 45 
C. CONFLICTING IDEOLOGY 
The DPRK is run with conflicting ideologies. It claims Juche as its main ideology 
by focusing on self-reliance in managing the state, but there are some inconsistencies 
depending on the situation.46 The DPRK leadership chooses an ideology which suits the 
best purpose for its well-being. Kim Il-sung was the originator of the Juche ideology and 
believed that any shortfall in production could be overcome with motivation and mass 
human capital, taking a page out of Mao Zedong’s Great Leap Forward experiment. Kim 
also set quotas that were impossible to achieve by human capital alone.47 Without the 
right tools and physical capital, it meant long and painful work hours for laborers. The 
DPRK used dilapidated and outdated machines to excavate coal (the West used more 
efficient technology and fewer people to mine an exponentially higher amount of coal 
than the DPRK). Kim’s first Three-Year Plan to rebuild the economy resulted in failure 
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due to inefficiencies and mismanagement. He had to extend the Three-Year plan to 
additional years to meet the objectives set forth at the beginning of the program.
48 
 
The transition to Kim Jong-il was the beginning of inconsistencies in the DPRK’s 
ideology framework. With the economic downturn and natural disasters that continued 
after the leadership transition, Kim Jong-il was forced to deliver economic performance 
instead of relying on the Juche ideology. Unfortunately, economic performance and 
Juche did not go hand in hand. The regime faced the dilemma of how to manipulate its 
founding ideology and at the same time improve the economy. For example, the DPRK 
stopped its production distribution system (PDS) in the face of famine and allowed open 
market activities. Eventually, when the DPRK was able to reopen the PDS, the 
government allowed open market activities, but also decided to bring the market 
economy to a halt and resume the PDS whenever it pleased. Sadly, the inconsistencies 
only made the public suffer.
49
  
In 2009, Kim Jong-il ordered a reform of the DPRK currency to curb 
hyperinflation. The goal of the regime was to curb the money supply to bring 
stabilization to purchasing power. The government suddenly announced an exchange of 
banknotes with restrictions on the amounts. This was unfavorable to black market 
entrepreneurs, who found themselves less wealthy overnight. Many foreign analysts 
questioned the currency reform because there was a flaw in its mechanism. The DPRK 
currency reform allowed a 10,000percent increase in wages, but kept the prices of goods 
at the same price level. When the regime approved the plan, it failed to comprehend that 
increasing the wages by 10,000 percent and keeping goods stagnant would create more 
hyperinflation than would an increase in the standard of living.50 The reform was 
disastrous from the start. The market did not want to sell goods at well below its prices, 
so merchants stopped selling goods; this even affected the elites, who had difficulty 
finding food for their families. A Korean Worker’s Party official, Pak Nam-gi, became 
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the scapegoat for the failed currency reform and it marked his death. Kim Jong-il tried to 
cover up the fiasco by going back to the Juche ideology.51  
D. DEBT-RIDDEN 
The DPRK was riddled with debt, which resulted from increased, unnecessary 
military spending. From 1968 to 1979, the DPRK outspent its South Korean counterpart 
on defense.52 The DPRK military grew late in the 1960s from 485,000 troops to 720,000 
by the 1980s.53 The DPRK had plenty of natural resources that it could have taken 
advantage of by trading with the international community, but it decided to focus 
primarily on its military and fulfill its budget shortfalls by borrowing from countries like 
France ($80 million), the United Kingdom ($160 million), and Japan ($400 million); 
these amounts are in addition to the aid the DPRK received from both the Soviet Union 
and China.54 Soon, foreign governments came to the conclusion that the DPRK would 
default on its loans. The DPRK owed a total of $12.5 billion at its peak.55 At one point, 
the DPRK asked Moscow to graciously forgive its $8.8 billion debt, but the Soviet Union 
refused the request.56 The DPRK was successful in bartering ginseng for some of the 
defaulted loans to a few countries, but the remaining balance appeared insurmountable. 
With its credit rating becoming worthless to the international community, the DPRK had 
no choice but to engage in illicit activities to survive.
57 
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Table 1.   Military Expenditures (Percent of Gross Domestic Product)58 
E. KEEPING UP WITH THE JONESES 
The DPRK made illogical decisions on multibillion-dollar construction projects to 
keep up with the ROK’s economic rise. The ROK had, in the early 1980s, won the bid to 
host the 1988 Summer Olympics in Seoul.59 At this point, the DPRK’s economy was 
faltering and it could not fathom the ROK was becoming more successful than the 
DPRK, especially hosting the caliber of an international event like the Olympics. The 
DPRK had to come up with a plan to show the public that it was still at the forefront of 
the race with the ROK. The DPRK leadership decided to pour what remained in its 
coffers into construction projects to host the equivalent of an Olympic-size event for its 
people. One mega project tried to defy the forces of the Earth: the DPRK planned to build 
a tunnel that was about 130 feet deep underneath a mountain to divert water to a natural 
river.60 This project eventually resulted in failure, which was followed by another $1.77 
billion project to build the longest dam in the world.61 The DPRK just did not have the 
technological capacity to complete these projects. Many of the projects were stopped in 
the middle of construction because it was realized that either the project was not feasible 
or ran out of funding. The leadership rushed into projects too large for what it was 
actually capable of completing. The DPRK leadership also resorted to terrorist acts 
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against the ROK by hijacking and blowing up a Korean airliner in 1987 in an attempt to 
put fear into the Olympic committee and the cause cancellation of the 1988 Olympics.62 
The DPRK also got blindsided when its two allies (the Soviet Union and China) decided 
to participate in the 1988 Summer Olympics.
63
  
F. HEAVY RELIANCE ON DONORS 
Finally, with a string of failures in multibillion dollar-projects in the 1980s, the 
DPRK was struck by a perfect storm when Soviet aid ended. The Soviet Union had been 
the lifeline of the DPRK. The Soviets played a crucial role in lifting the DPRK from the 
devastation of the Korean War and bringing it back to life with a combination of aid 
packages and trade agreements. The two countries signed the Treaty Concerning 
Economic and Cultural Cooperation agreement in 1949 binding them in a first-ever 
economic treaty.64 The treaty gave a mutual most-favored-nation status.65 The treaty also 
outlined specifically which commodities would be traded between the two nations.66 As 
part of the treaty, the Soviets also extended a credit of 212 million rubles for up to three 
years beyond 1949.67 There was also academic and technical assistance offered to the 
DPRK—the treaty outlined technical assistance be provided in areas such as iron works, 
zinc works, automobile assembly plants, steep pipe plants, blueprint designing, and 
geological surveys.68 Soviet scientists and academics were also invited to visit DPRK 
schools for lectures; student exchange programs were also created to provide the DPRK 
with the wealth of Soviet knowledge.69 At that time, trade with the Soviets reached its 
peak at 80 percent, but started to decrease to an average of 40 percent starting in the 
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1960s.70 As a result of the DPRK finding other sources of trade, the Soviet Union stepped 
aside as the DPRK’s main donor. The majority of products exported to the Soviet Union 
were deemed substandard. In 1964, a report in the Russian newspaper Pravda marked the 
15th anniversary of trade agreements with the DPRK.71 The article reported that more 
than 40 industrial plants were built with the assistance of Soviet Union aid and specified 
that combined electric power and heat-generating plants were also built with the help of 
the Soviet technicians in Pyongyang.72 In addition, the Soviets reconstituted more than 
50 industrial complexes after the damage from the Korean War. Finally, the Soviets 




With the end of the Cold War, Moscow decided that it was no longer in its best 
interest to support the DPRK. Before the aid stopped, DPRK’s trade with the Soviets 
accounted for almost 50 percent of the aggregate, but that dwindled down six fold by the 
early 1990s.74 The sudden removal of aid packages crippled the DPRK economy. 
Without adequate aid and support, the DPRK could not meet its energy quota. Without 
adequate crude oil and petroleum imports, DPRK machinery came to a halt.75 The DPRK 
could not run its steel factories or produce chemical fertilizers and cement. Most of the 
factories were running at 20 percent of full capacity.76 The shortfall in food production 
partly led to the famines in the mid-1990s that killed an estimated 400,000 to 4 million 
people.77  
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The Chinese provided the second-most incentives to the DPRK after the Korean 
War.78 The Chinese also had a great impact on the DPRK during the Korean War by 
providing commodities such as grains, meat, blankets, clothing, cotton, and cigarettes—
in addition to military assistance to defend against United Nations’ (UN) forces.79 In 
1953, the two countries signed an economic pact in Peking. The DPRK mainly exported 
machine tools, pig iron, metal, and alloy steel to China, whereas China sent coal, oil, 
cotton, raw rubber, sugar, and structural steel to the DPRK.80 China’s economic aid to the 
DPRK came in two forms: credit and aid. The Chinese gave $325 million to the DPRK in 
four installments from 1954 to 1957 as part of the DPRK’s reconstruction.81 Most of the 
Chinese technical assistance was concentrated around light industry (textile, leather 
processing, rubber processing, paper manufacturing, and construction) as opposed to the 
Soviets who provided great in-depth knowledge in the heavy industry area. Most of the 
Chinese military was still stationed in the DPRK after the Korean War. They were 
utilized mostly to assist in rebuilding bridges and to provide other forms of hard labor.82 
The Chinese provided three sets of interest-free loans to the DPRK after 1958, with the 
loan amounts ranging from $10 million to $105 million.83 The loans were used to build 
structures such as electric plants, tire factories, and radio equipment factories. All of the 
loans were to be paid off in the form of commodities during a 10-year period.
84
  
Although the DPRK had the possibility of independently rising from poverty after 
receiving assistance from outside sources, it never broke the cycle of aid to fully develop 
its potential. With the continuation of reliance on aid, the DPRK was set up for 
vulnerabilities and living perpetually as a welfare state. International sanctions resulting 
from the DPRK’s nuclear aspirations, and terrorist acts did not help because restrictions 
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limited its trading partners; the DPRK had no choice but to rely heavily on China.85 The 
DPRK desperately asked for assistance from the World Food Program and non-
governmental organizations to fulfill its shortfall in food production. The 1980s and 
1990s were total disasters, in part to Kim Jong-il’s economic policies. The DPRK could 




Table 2.   Aid Contributions from Communist Blocs87 
G. GLIMPSE OF CHANGE  
Kim Jong-un’s transition to leadership marked unprecedented events and 
speeches that went against his predecessor’s vision. Kim discussed the idea of bringing 
foreign investments into the DPRK, as evidenced in his 2013 New Year’s address to the 
public. He mentioned his intention to hire German lawyers and economists to look into 
the possibility of opening the DPRK’s economy to foreign investments.88 Also, the 
privileged class of about 900,000 DPRK citizens was granted usage of cell phones, but 
was limited to access only within the DPRK.89 According to the Associated Press’s 
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Pyongyang Bureau, the DPRK approved Internet access to foreign visitors starting in 
March 2013. KoryoLink has worked in Korea since 2009 to develop 3G Internet 
capability. Although this is great news for foreigners, DPRK citizens will still not be able 
to access the Internet or make phone calls outside the country. The 3G network capability 
is reported to cover 13.8 percent of the DPRK and 92.9 percent of the population area.90 
Eric Schmidt, the chairman of Google, visited the DPRK and emphasized the importance 





Figure 2.  Cell Phone Subscribers to KoryoLink 2009–2013 4Q92 
Although the DPRK has built economic zones with the help of China and the 
ROK in the past, it also has to concurrently build upon the infrastructure with major 
economic policy reforms to further develop the country. Economic zones such as 
Kaesong Industrial Park, Sinuju Special Administrative Region, and The Mount 
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Kumgang Tourism Zone are not enough to revive the economy, but are good initiatives.
93
 
Time will eventually shed some light on whether or not Kim Jong-un is a reformer. There 
is much work to be done to change the mindset of the DPRK’s leadership, and it all has 
to start from instilling accountability within its governance. Economic changes will not 
live up to their potential unless the DPRK advocates for political stability that will ensure 
that outside investors are confident about investing their funds into the reclusive state. If 
the regime is dedicated and truly believes in its economic reforms, Kim will have to 
implement regulations in industries to monitor private companies, fight corruption, and 
uphold accountability. With proper political and economic stability, it is highly likely that 
foreign investments will flow into the DPRK. 
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III. THE ROK AND TAIWAN’S ECONOMIC MODEL 
A. THE ROK’S ECONOMIC MODEL 
The ROK and Taiwan in their early stages, before their economic success, mirror 
the DPRK’s current economic conditions. Both the ROK and Taiwan share many 
similarities in their journey in becoming a model nation-state. Both countries have 
become economically successful after instituting major changes to their economic 
policies. It is difficult to believe that these two countries once lived in poverty and were 
forced to live under Japanese colonialism. Despite being governed under varying degrees 
of an authoritarian system, the leadership of both the ROK and Taiwan rendered sound 
economic decisions resulting in lasting prosperity. Surprisingly, on their road to 
economic haven, both countries transitioned from hard authoritarian regimes to 
democratic states.  
The ROK has always been a target of takeover because of its weak government 
and thirst for imperialism by neighboring states. Japan colonized the ROK from 1910 
until the end of World War II.94 The DPRK was better positioned to succeed 
economically than the ROK because both the Soviet Union and China fully supported the 
DPRK’s efforts to rebuild, whereas while the United States did not fully embrace the 
interim ROK president, Rhee Syng-man. The United States was very suspicious of the 
ROK government’s true allegiance and the rampant corruption within its bureaucracy. It 
was not until General Park Chung-hee’s successful military coup d’état over President 
Rhee’s government that the United States was swayed to provide major aid to the ROK.95  
The two decades from 1960s to 1970s saw rapid growth and expansion in the 
ROK’s economy.96 Former President Park’s long-term goal was to reduce the reliance on 
the U.S. aid and eventually to become self-sustaining. After the initial round of aid from 
the United States, the ROK quickly planned actions toward economic reform. The ROK 
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established an EPB and promoted a planned market economy broken into four phases.97 
The EPB tried to find areas within the economy where they possessed comparative 
advantage over the international market. The ROK’s main comparative advantage was 
within its human capital. The authoritarian system allowed more flexibility in using this 
human capital without the legitimacy of labor rights and unions. It drew on its labor force 
to work as one team and encouraged the workforce to pour their hearts out for the sake of 
their country’s development and future.98  
Next, the board implemented policies to devalue the currency to make its exports 
more competitive. The board selectively chose companies that it felt would succeed. The 
EPB instituted incentive programs for the private sector to perform to its highest level by 
providing tax rebates and low-interest loans and grants. The board implemented 
protectionist strategies by insulating infant industries with subsidies until the companies 
proved they were ready to compete in the international market.
99
  
The government nationalized commercial banks to make capital easily available 
for the private enterprises to invest into research/development and production. The 
relationship among the government, financial institutions, and private enterprises allowed 
decisions and information to be made efficiently and effectively. The executives of the 
private enterprises and the government met frequently to strategize and to discuss 
strengths and shortfalls. This collusion resulted in bringing transparency to the economic 
framework, but at the same time indirectly promoted corruption. Overall, the 




The ROK was fortunate enough to receive technology transfers and administrative 
knowledge from other countries that were ahead of the power curve. Although, the ROK 
was behind in innovation compared with others, it had the privilege of skipping the 
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research and testing phase that saved immense resource and time.101 The luxury of 
backwardness did not hold back the ROK from spending considerable amount of 
investment toward education. Statistics showed that in 1944, 90 percent of the ROK 
population did not have any formal education.102 By 1984, the statistics improved to 
where 51 percent of the relevant population was enrolled in secondary schools.103 
Finally, the ROK in 1990 was able to match on average most of the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries in the amount of spending 
on research and development (R&D) as a proportion of their GDP.
104
 
The results were astounding, with the ROK averaging an annual 9.2 percent 
growth in its GDP from 1962 to 1979.105 There were four stages to the ROK’s planned 
development model.106 The first covered from 1962 to 1966 soon as Park Chung-hee 
took over as the second president of the ROK. At the beginning, it was a government led 
effort in developing areas of “electricity, railroads, ports, and communications.”107 The 
EPB created metrics to gage the trend. The board promoted a shift from import 
substitution strategy to export oriented industrialization strategy. The second 
development plan covered from 1967 to 1971.108 During this period, the government 
emphasized its focus on the electronics and petrochemical industries.109 It maintained its 
export driven focus and also supported the agricultural sector by controlling the price of 
rice in assisting the farmers.110 The third economic development plan covered 1972–
1976.111 During this period, it marked a milestone in which the government produced 
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major developments in all the areas they selectively focused from the beginning. The 
industry sectors in steel plants, construction, petrochemical plants, and shipyards all saw 
expansions.112 The government also introduced new initiatives to improve and modernize 
rural areas to assist the farmers and the fishermen. The government set priorities on 
specific industries covering heavy and light and later came to develop the agrarian sector. 
The important factor is that the government tried to balance its portfolio instead of 
putting all the eggs in one basket like the DPRK had. The fourth development plan 
covered 1977–1981.113 At this point, the sheltered industries such as machinery, 
electronics, and shipbuilding were all unleashed to compete with the overseas companies. 
With concrete and significant signs of economic growth, the government transitioned to a 
focus on social development.
114
  
The results were monumental and unprecedented. In a matter of two decades, the 
ROK transitioned from an agrarian state to an industrialized driven state through the 
planned economy approach. The economic success partly brought new social movements 
and armed opposition political parties in supporting a transition from the hardline 
authoritarian system to a democratic-led state.115  
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Figure 3.   Economic Growth of the ROK116 
B. TAIWAN’S ECONOMIC MODEL 
Taiwan’s economic model is another process that the DPRK can use as a model. 
There are several areas where Taiwan has similarities with the DPRK. Taiwan was 
occupied by the Japanese in 1895 because of the defeat of China by the Japanese 
military.117 Taiwan was an authoritarian government led by Chiang Kai-shek. The 
Kuomintang was defeated in mainland China and fled to the island of Taiwan in 1949.118 
Before 1949, Taiwan relied on China for majority of its trade and resources, but when the 
country severed its ties with China, it brought hardship.119 Because of the devastations 
after World War II, the regime had to provide the populace with its basic needs to sustain 
power. At first, Taiwan’s focus was on survival, self-sustainability, and stability instead 
of pure economic development. Taiwan had to use its scarce resources to produce a quick 
turnaround to maintain its legitimacy.
120
  
Although Taiwan was under U.S. support after World War II, it was walking a 
thin line due to President Harry Truman’s hands-off policy on Taiwan in an attempt to 
prevent further escalation with the contentious Soviet Union and China. U.S. support 
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brought protection, legitimacy, and much-needed economic aid. The United States 
required Taiwan reform its political, economic, and social policies in exchange for aid. 
The United States granted $100M in aid packages from 1951 to 1965 to rebuild the 
country.121 The aid was helpful because there were no local infrastructures set up on the 
island. Also, the aid was welcoming news that brought unexpected power for Chiang’s 
interim government and hope for the future of Taiwan. Taiwan’s underlying goal was to 
build its military to overtake mainland China mainly because of Truman’s policy. Taiwan 
spent 80 percent of its foreign aid in strengthening their military and ran its propaganda 
on the military first objective similar to that of the DPRK.
122 
 
Taiwan’s leadership had to tighten controls to make sure the country did not 
falter. This meant that the state had to implement strict controls over its populace and the 
economy to execute policies. An important note to mention is that Chiang Kai-shek did 
not interfere with the economic reforms and took a detached approach.123 The 
Kuomintang was the sole political party of Taiwan, which easily allowed President 
Chiang to manipulate the system by gradually building a support network around his 
inner circle. He created an intelligence agency to fend off any detractors to protect the 
regime from coups. After the defeat of Japanese colonialism, Taiwan was able to 
confiscate majority of the Japanese properties, which included firms and equipment. The 
Japanese property helped the Kuomintang get a leg up in starting its economic reform.
124
 
Taiwan had four major economic goals: restore production, earn foreign 
exchange, maintain defense expenditures, and fight inflation.125 Inflation was one of the 
most difficult challenges for Taiwan to counter because of decreases in production, 
increases in supply of money, sharp increases in population that had shifted from the 
mainland, and prices exponentially increasing ten-fold from 1946 to 1949.126 To add to 
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the shortfalls, Taiwan was in great debt to foreign countries and had to earn its foreign 
exchange as a means to get out of debt. Its foreign reserve had dried up and Taiwan owed 
$10M to foreign entities.127 Finally, the vulnerability of attacks from mainland China 
forced Taiwan to balance majority of its budget into the defense expenditures to protect 
the island. This put enormous burdens on the state to balance the necessities of the public 
with the majority of the resources tied up in defense. All of these dire problems motivated 
the regime to transition into a more liberal economy and to put more emphasis on the 
greater need for production and export of goods.
128
 
These immense obstacles meant that Taiwan had to make drastic reforms to the 
economic policies to bring the country in par with other developing nations. This meant 
that the combination of the Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA), the Ministry of 
Finance (MOF), and the Bank of Taiwan had to work cohesively to reform the economic 
policies.129 This was a challenging task, but the country had to meet the four economic 
objectives in order to bring stability to the economy. The economic reform committees 
comprised technocrats who had autonomy to make important decisions. The supporting 
U.S. advisors were influential in the decision-making process and had direct access to 




Taiwan was a beneficiary of many wealthy and educated native Chinese exiles 
who had fled to the island well before the Chiang Kei-shek days. Although Taiwan’s 
information technology sector was virtually nonexistent, the government’s investment to 
education and science in combination with the existing exiles helped to bring expertise in 
growing the importance of R&D.131  
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Figure 4.   Taiwan’s Growth132 
Finally, the U.S. support was critical to Taiwan’s economic success. Taiwan 
received more than $4.2B in aid from the United States between 1949 and 1967.133 
During that period, Taiwan had a huge standing army of 600,000 to deter any attacks 
from China.134 The aid packages were crucial in stabilizing the uncontrollable economic 
downturn of Taiwan caused by huge debt, unstable exchange rate, and inflation. The 
technocrats’ plan was to meet short-term requirements to stabilize the economic distress. 
During the process, the ideology of Taiwan’s economic mindset shifted from the original 
planned economy to a unique set of open-market economy.
135
 
In comparing both the ROK’s and Taiwan’s economic models, there are many 
similarities. First, both developing states originally used a planned economy. Second, 
they both received assistance from the international community especially from the 
United States. Third, both states needed to earn their exchange rates because of out-of-
control inflation. Fourth, each of the states established economic institutions to bring the 
technocrats together to improve the economy. Fifth, both states insulated private 
companies until the companies were mature enough to compete in the international 
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market. Sixth, each of the states was able to take advantage of backwardness and 
technology transfers. Seventh, both states shifted from an import substitution strategy to 
an export-oriented industrialization strategy. Eighth, they both heavily supported the 
education system. Ninth, both countries had competent human capital that supported the 
state’s efforts toward economic improvement. Finally, both states were once authoritarian 
governments that transitioned into democratic states with the help of economic advances. 
There are more similarities, but the top 10 focuses are what the DPRK can experiment 
with in its attempt at economic reform to bring another unprecedented growth story back 
to East Asia. 
The technocrats and the bureaucrats in both the ROK and Taiwan governments 
implemented the most logical and efficient policies to drive the economic growth, but 
there is very little credit to the intangible factor of purely human desire to rid themselves 
of poverty and infringement on human rights. Both the citizens of the ROK and Taiwan 
grew up in a generation in which they lacked the basic necessities in comparison to their 
children, who have reaped the benefits of economic success. On top of living in poverty, 
they were mandated to give up basic human rights and forced to toil under Japanese rule. 
Years and years of building the desire and motivation to one day live freely with the basic 
amenities of life resulted in high growth for both the ROK and Taiwan. Coincidently, the 
non-elites of the DPRK desire the same basic necessities of life and human rights, which 
can be an important factor in the DPRK’s economic future if the right set of economic 
policies is implemented. 
Conversely, there were some contrasting ideologies between the ROK and the 
Taiwan economic models. The ROK government was more involved in the economic 
daily activities than its counterpart. This was partly because of the inexperience of the 
Koreans in the commerce sector versus the ethnic Chinese who were a step ahead.136 The 
Taiwan model allowed the market forces to take its course, whereas the ROK model was 
more plan-driven and later transitioned into an open-market economy. Next, the Taiwan 
model left its interest rates to the market forces, but the Korean model artificially 
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suppressed its interest rates to the lowest point possible.137 Finally, the manner in which 
the two governments took actions toward their economic policies was quite different. The 
ROK tended to be more aggressive and impulsive when it figured out that the economic 
development was well on its way, whereas Taiwan’s approach tended to be more 
enduring and resilient.138 Finally, the ROK placed great emphasis and trust on the 
conglomerates, also known as Jaebols, in competing with the international market in 
propelling its economy, but Taiwan’s economic focus was on small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SME) which accounted for 85 percent of its industrial output.139 
All in all, there is no silver bullet when it comes to restructuring and improving a 
country’s economic condition. With all certainty, the political, economic, and social 
conditions have to be considered at the time of reform implementation. Although the 
ROK and the Taiwan economic experiences are tier 1 models to be considered in 
revamping the DPRK’s current economic situation; government leaders, technocrats, and 
entrepreneurs have to carefully choose specific policies that are in tune with their 
environment and seriously consider the consequences that come with each decision. 
Eventually, the mixed basket of the ROK and the Taiwan economic models should steer 
the DPRK in the right path toward economic stability.  
  
                                                 




IV. HOW TO TRANSITION THE DPRK INTO AN OPEN-
MARKET ECONOMY? 
A. THE CHINESE MODEL 
Mao Zedong founded the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 under a 
communist system after 20 years of a devastating civil war.140 Mao’s focus was to create 
an egalitarian system and to maintain tight central control by the state. The government 
implemented radical policy changes to dismantle the drastic gap between the classes and 
to eliminate corruption. Mao tried to resurrect the economy by implementing the Great 
Leap Forward, which was an absolute failure. With Mao’s death in 1976, the PRC saw a 
transition away from Mao’s ideology and put more focus on economic transformation 
under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping.141 Deng was the mastermind in bringing 
economic reforms to the forefront of China’s agenda. Deng pursued radical economic 
policies that were not in line with the PRC’s beliefs. After Deng left office in 1987, the 
Chinese economy continued to flourish under the leadership of Jiang Zemin who 
continued to support and improve Deng’s initiatives.142 The economic transformation 
helped bring millions of the lower class out of poverty while increasing the wealth gap 
between the classes. The irony of the economic success was that capitalist tendencies 
were a deviation from the PRC’s founding ideology. How was China able to transition to 
the open-market economy and still maintain the political ideology? The answer to this 
question could help the DPRK immensely to make its transition less of an obstacle.143  
The success of the economic transformation is dependent upon a two-front 
approach of systematic reform and development policies.144 Most successful models 
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reflect a strong system and sound developmental policies. One factor cannot live without 
the other, meaning that a strong system will not last without meaningful development 
policies to strengthen the overall foundation. China is a perfect example: leadership 
pursued systematic reforms along with economic developmental policies to become the 
number two economy in the world.145 History has shown that even the once-powerful 
Soviet Union collapsed because of its inability to adjust to the changing environment. 
China witnessed its counterpart disappear from the world’s leadership pedestal and 
forced the technocrats to make strategic systematic and developmental policy reforms 
that adhered to the shift in the world’s balance of power.146  
After witnessing the fall of the Soviet Union, it is difficult for a socialist system to 
survive unless the developing forces are identified, and there are considerable changes to 
the structure, institutions, and policies to counter the catalysts. Chinese leaders, especially 
Deng Xiaoping, understood the changing current and realized that major restructuring 
was necessary for the success of China’s future. Understanding the consequences and the 
sensitivity surrounding any attempts to undermine Mao’s ideology, Deng’s balancing act 




Deng Xiaoping’s era in China is the most influential period in China’s step 
toward a market economy. His transformation of the PRC’s ideology was the trigger that 
launched a broad range of economic and social reforms. Deng’s economic reforms aimed 
at dissolution of planned economy and a return to the market economy. His success was 
attributed to the market reforms by placing the right technocrats in the right positions to 
lead the efforts. Although the majority of the old guard resisted drastic changes, Deng 
was able to maneuver through the politics to implement his initiatives. Deng was able to 
swiftly bring economic growth and raised the standard of living. His policies accelerated 
China’s involvement and raised the status on the world’s economic pedestal.  
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The Chinese reform started with identifying the weakness within the society, 
which was the societal gap between the rural and the urban populations. This reform was 
a two-phase approach that started in 1978 with changes in rural agriculture policies.148 
Deng concentrated on revamping both the agricultural sector and the heavy/light 
industries. He wanted to de-collectivize the farming land and return it to family farming 
in order to transition into the open market.149 The government tried to mend the divide in 
the rural population by redistributing the state land to the population and raising the 
agricultural commodity prices by encouraging rural enterprises. The state relaxed many 
of its strict agricultural policies to give the rural population room to grow with the new 
initiatives.150  
 
Figure 5.  Rise in Inequality151 
Next was urban reform, which started in 1984. This reform constituted transfer 
and apportionment of state-sponsored enterprises into the urban population.152 Many of 
the state enterprises were closed down, consolidated, or transferred in a major effort to 
reduce the portion of state-run institutions. Deng was opening China to foreign 
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investment and to promote international trade. The government’s coastal development 
strategy of creating special economic zones (SEZs) in the southern part of China along 
the ports was a success. The SEZs had fewer restrictions, which allowed flexibility to 
execute in an open-market economy as well as trade with foreign countries. Many urban 
workers flocked to the SEZs to earn a better living.153 The Chinese technocrats carefully 
devised these plans after the failures experienced in the fall of the Soviet Union and its 
attempt at transition.154 The whole process was gradual and the technocrats were able to 
make adjustments along the way to steer the economy in the right direction. One of the 
main keys to success was the gradual phasing out from planned pricing toward market 
pricing. The immediate results of the market reforms were not up to par. The rural 
population had not yet assimilated to the market process and the rural incomes did not 
increase as planned originally. The urban population saw exponential growth in its wealth 
with individual entrepreneurship and real estate ventures. Corruption and rent-seeking 
behaviors were rampant. All of these issues created an unstable condition that produced 
collective social movements. Students demanded freedom of speech, political democracy, 
and establishment of rule of law.
155
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Table 3.   Chinese GDP Growth (1952–2005)156 
In the face of the new market economy, the old ideology conflicted with the new 
changes. The market and social transformation went against the government’s ideology 
and student protestors jumped on the opportunity. The government tried to subdue the 
social movement and find solutions to mend the differences between neo-liberalism and 
neo-authoritarianism. The Tiananmen Square massacre was a highly publicized incident 
in which Chinese students were run over by military tanks. The government decided that, 
to maintain legitimacy of their government, all social movements had to be stopped in 
order to maintain stability.157 The government’s economic policies resulted in social 
upheaval, but this upheaval gave the state more reason to flex its muscle when subduing 
violence. The government’s creation of market pricing and neo-liberalism soon replaced 
the old socialist ideology. Finally, the creation of market economy symbolized the 
success of the social movement in the late 1980.
158
 
A. LESSONS FROM CHINA 
The thought of comparing the road to China’s success and that of the DPRK can 
be startling, but strangely there are some similarities. The leadership before Deng 
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Xiaoping was similar to that of Kim Jong-un’s forefathers when it comes to flawed 
ideologies and unsuccessful attempts at lifting their respective countries out of poverty. 
The inflexibility within the leadership and irresponsible economic policies led to 
unnecessary catastrophes in human lives. A comparison between Deng and Kim Jung-un 
is worthwhile. Deng was a proven and a charismatic leader who led the efforts in 
transitioning China away from Mao Zedong’s flawed ideology. Although Kim is a young 
and an inexperienced leader, he has hinted at major economic overhauls to clean up the 
mess left behind by his predecessors. Deng’s famous quote—”it does not matter whether 
a cat is white or black, as long as it catches mice”—is an invaluable lesson for Kim.159 
Kim has to use his new leadership position to change the economic policies to bring life 
to Deng’s quote and gain the trust of the DPRK citizens. Finally, Kim has to keep 
pushing for economic stability and move toward modernization which will eventually 
bring social progress as evidenced at the Communist Party’s 3rd Plenum of the 18th 
Central Committee.160 
Kim Jong-un’s most daunting task is reforming the economy in the face of 
contradicting ideologies and opposition groups. Deng was in the same situation to uphold 
Mao’s ideology while having to bring China into unchartered territory. Deng was quoted: 
“We must…set things right, shatter the shackles on thought… and seek truth from 
facts.”161 He emphasized the importance of respecting his predecessor’s philosophy, but 
at the same time urged the people to think for themselves. Deng wanted to unite his 
people for one cause, which was to pursue better living conditions through economic 
reforms. He wanted to respect the past, but at the same time move on to build a better 
future.162 Kim also cannot erase the history of what his grandfather and father have 
carved in history. Both Kim Il-Sung’s and Kim Jong-il’s portraits are still displayed in 
public, just as Mao’s is mounted on the wall of Tiananmen Square even after the 
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implementation of the economic reforms. What Kim Jong-un can do at this point is to 
move forward with the changes for the sake of long-term stability.163  
There are interesting questions to be asked about China’s unprecedented 
economic growth. Are there limitations to continual economic growth without a full 
transition to open-market economy and democracy? Can capitalism and socialism survive 
under one roof? The Chinese have learned an extensive lesson from the fall of the Soviet 
Union and clearly have made all the right maneuvers to introduce capitalism within their 
society.164 A continued Chinese economic growth is contingent upon the Chinese 
government’s continued efforts in reform with the proper developmental policies. Current 
President Xi Jinping has signaled a continued emphasis on Chinese economic 
development at the 3rd Plenum. Xi has hinted that market forces will have a greater role 
in how the technocrats will allocate their resources. Although China is not a form of 
democracy, it is evident from reforms made at the 3rd Plenum meeting that the Chinese 
leadership is gradually moving toward more liberal policies by relaxing the one-child 
policy and eliminating the labor camps that housed political dissidents.165 China has 
proved that capitalism and socialism can live under one roof, but considering the tide is 
shifting toward more capitalistic policies, only time will tell if socialism will survive. The 
DPRK must understand that major economic reforms will eventually force political 
reforms and developmental policies that correctly reflect the capitalist system. It is 
crucial for the DPRK to withstand the political and social consequences in the wage of 
economic reforms.166 
B. THE DPRK’S BLUEPRINT 
The keys to the DPRK’s economic reform depends on how it executes in the 
following areas: creating institutions; emphasizing education; running the SEZs to 
maximum capacity; relying on comparative advantages and export; earning exchange 
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rates; providing subsidies and incentives for developing private enterprises; taking 
advantage of backwardness; and joining international economic organizations. 
First of all, the DPRK has to understand the current economic conditions and 
realize where it fits in the bigger picture. According to Michael Porter, a professor at 
Harvard University, developing countries are tripped up by microeconomic failures.167 
The DPRK has certainly made horrible policy decisions that have landed it in deep waters 
in the past. Porter maintains that successful economic development requires progress on 
multiple fronts simultaneously. He stresses that reform efforts need to be tightly 
connected to the current stage of the country’s development. Porter prescribes a stage 
theory of economic development. The DPRK would be considered a factor-driven 
economy compared with the United States’ innovation-driven economy.168 
 
Figure 6.  Porter’s Stages of Economic Development169 
The DPRK has to organize a committee similar to Japan’s Ministry of Economic 
Trade and Industry or the ROK’s Economic Planning Board to organize and build viable 
economic policies. This type of institution would consist of technocrats and capitalists to 
examine the ways to develop the existing economy and how to fully utilize the physical 
and human capital. The committee has to determine what the country’s comparative 
advantages are and find the right balance among heavy and light industrial and service 
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sectors. The past mistakes have involved imbalance in the three sectors and total 
mismanagement of government spending. 
Education is critical to innovative ideas. Before the Meji Restoration in 1868, 
only about 15 percent of the Japanese population was considered literate.170 But with the 
development of the Meji Restoration and compulsory education in full effect, Japan 
became one of the world’s most educated countries. Considering that both the ROK and 
Taiwan were colonized by Japan, the education priorities also became an important part 
of their priorities.
171
 The DPRK’s literacy rate is currently at the top of the standings, 
with citizens older than 15 years of age having a literacy rate of 99 percent.172 In 1958, 
the DPRK instituted a seven-year compulsory education program for primary and 
secondary education.173 Currently, the DPRK has a 12-year compulsory education that 
consists of six years of elementary school, three years of middle school, and three years 
of high school. All of the education is state funded. There is no doubt that the citizens of 
the DPRK have the capability to overcome the high learning curve, especially with the 
discipline that the authoritarian regime has instilled in them.
174
 
Just as China successfully experimented with the introduction of SEZs in its 
coastal developmental plan, the DPRK has to utilize its SEZs to their full capacity.175 
The DPRK government has not fully divested its efforts into SEZ improvement. The 
SEZs will not work like China’s experience unless proper reforms and developmental 
policies are instituted. The DPRK cannot maintain the status quo and efficiently run its 
factories. The investors and laborers have to be fully incentivized to reap the total 
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benefits of the capitalist system. If the DPRK is able to show the international community 
that it is serious about making changes to its policies, the market forces will naturally 
flood the SEZs with major investments that will benefit the DPRK’s overall economy.176 
The DPRK has to rely on its comparative advantages to focus on export-oriented 
industrialization. The DPRK has a large pool of competent laborers who can learn 
technical and manufacturing work; the key is to provide them with training. The human 
capital in the DPRK is the most critical component in making economic reform 
successful. The human capital has to be fully utilized to maximize profitability. 
Transitioning from the state-run enterprise to allowing citizens to earn their share of 
profit will incentivize citizens to work harder. The DPRK’s low-cost labor can produce 
international products along with natural resources that can be dominant sources of its 
competitive advantage. The DPRK should concentrate on producing commodities or 
relatively simple products designed in more advanced countries because its technological 
level is not up to par. The country should concentrate its companies having a limited role 
in the value chain and focus strictly on assembly, labor-intensive manufacturing, and 
resource extractions. Most of the technology should be assimilated through imports, 
foreign direct investments, and imitations. The international community will flock to the 
DPRK for investments. The DPRK will have low-wage laborers that producers yearn for 
because labor costs are rising in China. Once markets such as China dry up, corporations 
will want to move their plants where it is more enticing, such as to the DPRK. 
The DPRK has to earn the exchange rate of its currency. The DPRK tried to 
revalue its currency system in the past, but met total failure.177 Having a sound and stable 
currency will raise consumer confidence and draw investors to the market. If the 
government can set up a stable exchange rate, it can fight inflation at the same time. The 
government has to decide to decrease government expenditure from the total GDP. 
Currently, the DPRK is spending 30.3 percent of its GDP on the military.178 If 
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government can channel some of the military funding to other sectors, that would 
improve the balance sheet. The international community will also demand that the DPRK 
reduce its military expenditures as a condition of receiving loans. The ROK, during its 
economic rise, kept its interest rates intentionally low to make its currency cheaper for 
borrowing and deflated its exchange rate so that its products were cheaper in the 
international market, making its companies more competitive.
179
 
The government has to provide incentives and subsidization to private companies 
to encourage trade by both importing and exporting.180 The DPRK will have to pick the 
winners in certain industries while providing losers with subsidies to soften the blow. 
Public and private cooperation is very important to the success of the system. There has 
to be transparency and flexibility between the two groups to make any adjustments along 
the way. These incentives and rules will help transition the DPRK from an illicit 
economy to a formal economy.
181
  
The DPRK has advantages because of its backwardness. It can receive technology 
transfers and receive assistance from international academia. The DPRK has the 
capability to leapfrog in areas such as technology by reverse engineering and producing 
imitations. As evidenced in the DPRK’s ability to spread viruses in U.S. networks, the 
DPRK does have developers that are technologically savvy, proving science fields are 
more advanced than previously estimated.
182
 
Before China’s initiative to open relations with the United States, it was 
considered outcast by the rest of the international community.183 Deng’s economic 
reforms meant opening up trade to foreign entities. It was important for China to receive 
accession and participate in trade associations such as the World Trade Organizations 
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(WTO). The WTO accepted China’s request to join the organization on December 11, 
2001, making it the 143rd member of the trade organization.184 This accomplishment 
gave China the opportunities to expand the trade and to protect its interests. The DPRK’s 
road to economic reform means that the state will have to interact with international trade 
partners. The WTO might be a long-term goal, but the DPRK can, in the short-term, 
participate in regional trade organizations such as the Pacific Partnership Free Trade 
Agreement. Currently, there are 11 Asian countries along with the United States 
participating in the organization.185 The Asian countries should also give favorable trade 
status to the DPRK to provide opportunities for the fragile economy to develop. Cheap 
labor with value added and efficient productivity will naturally force other countries to 
explore the DPRK’s potential.186 
The road to China’s success came at a steep price, with millions of peasants dying 
as a result of inefficient policies, but with the changing of guard brought out-of-the-box 
thinking that has made China a force to be reckoned with. The DPRK is at the stage 
where Kim Jong-il has relinquished the guard to his son, Kim Jong-un. Just as China 
experienced millions of casualties resulting from inefficient policies, the DPRK too 
implemented major policy blunders in the past. Kim Jong-un has a proven template and 
roadmap to success in his hands. Now, will he bring to DPRK the same trial and 
tribulation that China has experienced within the past three decades?  
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V. THE DPRK’S POTENTIAL 
Historically, many analysts have predicted that the collapse of the Kim regime 
was inevitable, but they have all fallen short of their forecasts. The Kim dynasty has been 
in existence for more than 60 years, unlike its socialist brethren who have collapsed along 
the way. According to Bruce Cumings, the DPRK’s leadership is very rational and its 
ability to survive should not be underestimated.
187
 The regime has the potential to 
succeed in major economic reforms because of the recent leadership change, 
advancement in nuclear technology, existing SEZs, national interests of China, the 
DPRK’s promising natural resources, and the comparative advantage of human capital.  
A. LEADERSHIP CHANGE 
The DPRK’s leadership transition is a signal of much change to come in the near 
future and an opportunity for Kim Jong-un to take the DPRK to the forefront of major 
economic development. There are signs that Kim will implement major changes to the 
infrastructure, technology, and trade with socioeconomic reforms. Most importantly, a 
leadership change means that there is a fresh set of eyes and a view that will break the 
conundrum that has considerably affected the DPRK’s economic standing. As mentioned 
previously, that DPRK elites were granted usage of cell phones and that the DPRK 
approved Internet access to foreign visitors shows the progress being made, with even the 
chairman of Google becoming involved.
188
 
B. ADVANCEMENT IN NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY 
The DPRK’s advancement in nuclear capabilities will add value to the regime’s 
legitimacy and survival. Former U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates estimated in 
2011 that the DPRK is about five years away from having the capability to manufacture a 
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small warhead capable of fitting within its payload.
189
 According to Andrei Lankov, the 
DPRK has used the nuclear weapons program as a bargaining chip to muscle its way into 
receiving international aid.190 It has a higher probability of completing its nuclear 
capabilities, if they are not completed already, which will result in more legitimacy for 
the government and more ways to reap financial gains from the international community. 
In the past, the regime was able to survive because it was masterful in negotiating its way 
into gaining massive economic packages to stave off near collapses.191 The nuclear 
weapons card plays nicely into the DPRK’s ever-so-slightly-changing ideologies. With 
recent developments of the Iran nuclear deal, it gives hope for the international 
community to take major steps in changing the direction of the DPRK’s downward spiral. 
The sooner the nuclear capability is acknowledged by the international community, the 
sooner the economic reforms can be implemented. Kim Jung-un will be able to use the 
DPRK’s nuclear technology, hopefully with positive intentions, to help with the 




C. SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES 
The DPRK has mobilized SEZs in the past, starting with the Rason SEZ near the 
Russian border in 1991.193 The Sinuiju Special Administrative Region, led by a former 
Chinese governor named Yang Bin, started in 2002 near the Chinese border.194 Both of 
the Rason and Sinuiju SEZs resulted in failure because of lack of support and 
coordination between the Chinese and the DPRK governments. Much-needed 
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infrastructure projects and roads were never built. Both establishments had positive starts 
with ambitious goals, but their management failed to follow through with implementation 
goals. Chinese operatives wanted to establish gambling facilities within the zones, but 
were denied by the Chinese government.195  
The DPRK lacked proper management of past attempts, but there are some 
positive outcomes on other SEZ ventures associated with the ROK. Economic zones such 
as Gaesung Industrial Complex as a special industrial district and the Mount Kumgang 
Zone as a special tourism zone where the Hyundai business group spent $942 million for 
tourism have not been enough to revive the economy, but are good initiatives.196 The 
DPRK still has an opportunity to capitalize on the SEZs with economic policy changes. 
The concept is on the right track, but the DPRK requires the right type of management to 
bring success to these investments. Most important, the success of one or a combination 
of these SEZs can prove to the international community that the DPRK is serious about 




D. HUMAN CAPITAL 
The DPRK has the fourth largest military in the world.198 It prides itself on 1.2 
million active duty troops and approximately 4.7 million reserve troops.199 The DPRK 
spent more than 25 percent of its GDP on defense, which is an enormous scale even 
compared with the tier-one countries.200 Within the 100-km confines of its demilitarized 
zone, the DPRK has positioned 65 percent of its military units and 80 percent of its 
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aggregate firepower to the front line.201 With 700,000 troops and 8,000 artillery systems 
forward-deployed, the North can strike Seoul in minutes of Kim Jung-un’s orders.202 The 
Kim Jong-il regime has always preached a military-first attitude to deter any form of 
aggression from the ROK and its allies, but there are some signs that Kim Jong-un is 
shifting the balance of power toward the military from the Worker’s Party with the recent 
execution of his uncle, Jang Song-thaek. If Kim shows signs of making drastic reform 
changes, he will have to shift the emphasis and redistribute the funding away from the 
military to offset the cost of reform policies. With the massive number of personnel in the 




The sure size of the workforce also provides a competitive labor rate for foreign 
companies. The Gaesung Industrial Complex is an inter-Korean operated economic zone 
that was opened in 2004.204 The complex provides income for 40,000 DPRK employees, 
and interviews have suggested that the laborers are hard-working, well educated, and 
have potential to increase production in the future.205 The major incentive for foreign 
companies is the labor. The employees at the Gaesung Industrial Complex earn $73 per 
month; the workers net about $40, with the remaining balance going toward taxes and 
social contributions.206 The workers are more likely to take the hard currency because of 
the instability of the DPRK’s currency with its high inflation.  
E. NATURAL RESOURCES 
The DPRK’s major potential comes from its natural resources. If the DPRK is 
able to efficiently manage its mineral assets and convert it to financial gains, it can mean 
substantial income for the state’s budget. According to Goldman Sachs research, the 
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DPRK has “large potential deposits of minerals including magnesite, coals, uranium, and 
iron ore, valued at around 140 times the DPRK’s 2008 GDP at current market prices.”207 
The research indicates that the net present value of the mineral resources is 18 times that 
of its GDP.208  
North Korea is Rich (and South Korea is Poor) in Minerals 
 
Magnesite bn ton 6.0 1,376 - 100 
Limestone bn ton 100 996 10 1 
Uranium ore 000 ton 4,000 628 - 100 
Lignite bn ton 16 343 - 100 
Anthracite coal bn ton 4.5 257 1.4 65 
Iron bn ton 5.0 214 0.02 99 
Gold 000 ton 2 45.3 0.04 93 
Zinc 000 ton 21,000 12.6 588 100 
Lead 000 ton 10,600 9.12 404 100 
Copper 000 ton 2,900 5.41 56 100 
Silver 000 ton 3–5 1.86 1.58 95 
Molybdenum 000 ton 54 1.13 22 99 
Rosette graphite 000 ton 2,000 0.75 121 100 
Tungsten trioxid 000 ton 246 0.39 127 89 
Barite 000 ton 2,100 0.22 842 100 
Fluorspar 000 ton 500 0.08 477 100 
Talcum 000 ton 700 0.06 8,152 92 
Kaolinite 000 ton 2,000 0.03 106,335 11 
Manganese 000 ton 100–300 0.01 176 100 
Nickel 000 ton 10–20 0.00 - 100 
Asbestos 000 ton 13 0.00 511 - 
Total (times 2008 GDP)  142   
Note: Reserves for South Korea are the sum of confirmed and estimated reserves as of 2007. North Korean  
data are potential reserves, based on information from North Korea,The Institute for National Unification, 
Hyundai IAEA, EIA, and GS Global ECS Research. 
Table 4.   Comparison of Mineral Resources209 
The ROK currently imports 97 percent of its mineral resources, and the DPRK 
holds six of the major mineral sources that the ROK imports, which can be seen as 
beneficial to the DPRK with future trade agreements.
210
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F. CHINA’S INTEREST 
China supports the DPRK’s longevity for political and economic reasons. 
According to Victor Cha, China as an up and coming global hegemon wants to make sure 
that the U.S. circle of influence does not border its state.211 It is quite convenient to have 
the DPRK as a buffer zone to distance itself from U.S. influence. At the same time, China 
does not want a flood of refugees coming across its border in the case of a collapsed 
regime. China is currently the DPRK’s leading trade partner and is able to take advantage 
of low-cost labor, along with favorable trade access to the DPRK’s mineral deposits.212 It 
is in China’s best interest to keep DPRK float with the current situation as long as 
possible. China’s protectionist attitude toward the DPRK and reluctance to publicly 




G. IMPROVED SOCIETY 
There are some signs of improvement in standard of living in some parts of the 
DPRK. Some economists feel that the socioeconomic reforms implemented by Kim Jong-
il in the latter 1990s are coming into fruition.214 The construction industry is booming, 
with evidence of buildings being renovated and streets being repaved. There are 
noticeable increases in vehicle traffic on the streets and increased accidents. The large 
district markets have expanded from 38 and are projected to increase to 42 beyond 
2014.215 There are increases in open-market activities, with currency traders even 
exchanging U.S. dollars and Chinese Yuan, and Japanese yen. Many restaurants, beer 
bars, and small cafes have opened to accommodate the citizens in Pyongyang. The 
general public can enjoy ski resorts, amusement parks, theaters, and shopping malls. 
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Finally, the bustling life even accommodates gambling and prostitution (in the 
background).216 The picture that has been depicted is considerably different in the rural 
areas, but only time will tell if future economic reforms can help to extend the amenities 
in life to rural areas. 
H. CURTAILING CORRUPTION/ILLICIT ACTIVITIES IS NECESSARY 
The DPRK’s potential for economic reform success hinges upon the 
government’s concurrent effort in implementing sweeping policies to curtail corruption. 
There is rampant and blatant political corruption within the DPRK. The DPRK is trying 
to find every financial avenue to stay afloat, whereas the UN is pressing heavy sanctions 
to choke the DPRK’s ability to finance its nuclear ambitions. According to the 
Transparency International’s 2012 Corruption Perceptions Index, the DPRK ranked first, 
tied with Somalia and Afghanistan as the world’s most corrupt nation.217  
The DPRK is known for its illegal activities in drug trafficking, foreign arms 
sales, insurance fraud, and counterfeiting. The DPRK is the world’s worst offender in 
counterfeiting $100 bills.218 The DPRK had stolen the same printing press that U.S. 
Treasury used in Germany during the fall of the Berlin Wall. The $100 bills can be only 
detected by high-tech devices from the U.S. Federal Reserve.219 The DPRK also imports 
the same ink that U.S. imports from Switzerland. The north is flooding the market with 
about $400 to $500 million in U.S. currency.220 Pyongyang’s Korea National Insurance 
Commission has played a large role in insurance scams; for instance, making fraudulent 
claims about weather damage to ships and aircrafts.221 The fraudulent claims netted were 
sent to Kim Jong-il and his insiders to spend on luxury goods and pleasure. The U.S. 
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Treasury has estimated that the DPRK makes approximately $200 million on drug 
trafficking.222 The inner circle is lavishing in luxury goods while more than half of the 
country is going through one of the worst famines in history. The north caters toward the 
few upper privilege citizens that have influence while using coercion on rest of the public 
to maintain stability.  
DPRK officials are, however, cracking down on black market goods and 
defection. According to The Economist, the number of defections has dropped to 1,509 
(or a 44 percent decrease).
223
 The survival of the regime is in jeopardy if enough DPRK 
citizens understand there is a better life outside of the DPRK—the curiosity factor might 
lead to the demise of the regime.
224
 It is in the DPRK’s best interest to make sure that 
outside merchandise is kept to a minimum to eliminate any curiosity among the people. If 
the DPRK does not reform its economy to follow the pace in which its citizens are 
attuning to the trends and news of outside society, there is a higher chance of revolt from 
the citizens. 
There is also an efficient system of transferring foreign currency into the DPRK. 
Brokers from China help to deliver remittances to each of the recipients.225 Even the 
defectors that are residing in the ROK are able to send remittances to some of their family 
members by paying off officials. It is ironic that the DPRK allows this, but it is one way 
to generate revenue and allow the flow of foreign currency into the financial system.
226
 A 
recent article from the China Morning Post suggests that the DPRK is using cash couriers 
and false aliases to maneuver around UN-mandated sanctions to fund its regime’s 
appetite.
227
 DPRK defector Kim Kwang Jin worked for North Korea’s state insurance 
company and witnessed the covert avenues that the DPRK used to avoid from any 
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restrictions imposed on them. Kim Kwang Jin was quoted as saying, “I stuffed $20M into 
two suitcases one day and sent it to Pyongyang as a special gift for then leader Kim Jong-
il.”228 The DPRK has been sanctioned since the 1950s, but time after time, it has been 
able to outwit the United States and the UN in meeting its objectives. The UN was once 
successful in seizing the DPRK’s asset of $25 million from Macau-based Banco Delta 
Asia. The United States later released the $25 million back to the north after its promise 
to ease its nuclear ambitions.229 The north has learned many lessons from that $25 
million seizure, such as to hide the cash in small amounts and in different accounts, so 
that it is not dependent on the money if one of the accounts is seized. The DPRK has used 
diplomats to transport cash. According to ROK government sources, it is very difficult to 
detect the cash flow of DPRK assets. With simple ways to change aliases, and China not 
supporting ship inspections, the DPRK will keep laundering illegal cash to fund its illegal 
activities. If the United States or the UN ever hinders the DPRK’s attempts, the DPRK 
will dig deeper to finding other means to meet its objectives.
230
 
The government is able to survive because the rule of law is enforced in the state. 
The rampant corruption can disrupt any major efforts at economic reform because these 
two entities cannot survive together. Investment capital will be important to implement 
the policies, and those assets can only be derived from the international community only 
if the DPRK government enforces the rule of law to rid of corruption within the ranks. 
Corruption reform has to start from the top down. It is impossible to fully get rid of 
corruption; therefore, a gradual approach with realistic metrics should be considered.  
The DPRK possesses the pedigree to become a successful developmental state 
with potential internal strengths and with external financial and technical support. The 
key is for the leadership to understand its comparative advantages and to fully maximize 
its potential with the right economic reform policies. Although the DPRK has a long road 
ahead, efficient and precise decision-making will help catapult its dampened economy 
                                                 




through the roof. It is also important to realize that corruption and economic reform 
policies do not mesh. A dual-track effort to reduce corruption will be vital in stabilizing 




The DPRK is in a speculative state in which the regime can unfold into either end 
of the spectrum at any moment. It is quite a phenomenon for a country such as the DPRK 
to have survived thus far with its belligerent behavior and its ambitions to bring a nuclear 
program into fruition. How did the DPRK survive this long and why did the international 
community let the current scenario come to be? Victor Cha, in The Impossible State, cites 
the DPRK’s large military structure, the border with China, and the U.S. priorities on the 
war on terrorism as the main drivers in creating the current scenario.231 So, is the 
DPRK’s existence is purely a fluke because it was lucky to share a border with China, 
who has a vested interest that the DPRK remains status quo? Did Al-Qaeda’s leadership 
save the DPRK by swaying the attention of the United States to a war on terrorism? 
These are important questions to ponder when determining what are at stake for the 
DPRK in the near future in combination with proposed economic policy reforms. 
A. INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY INFLUENCE 
The days of Six-Party Talks are over; there have not been any productive 
discussions since 2008. Both the DPRK and the ROK engaged in bilateral agreements 
with summits in 2000 and 2007.232 The engagement policy had positive starts, but did not 
result in any meaningful progress. The DPRK has not kept up with its part of the 
agreement in most cases. Last, the George W. Bush administration’s hard-lined stance led 
to more of a relationship strain, which resulted in the test of nuclear weapons in 2006, 
2009, and 2012.233  
The past participants of the Six-Party Talks have other priorities on their national 
agendas that will deter them from going against the status quo. Nevertheless, the 
participants do realize the breaking point in which they would have to get involved to 
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restrain the DPRK’s desire to completely disrupt the international and Northeast Asia 
order. The key is to act before it is too late. The DPRK’s nuclear advancement is one key 
parameter to watch because completion of nuclear technology could change the terms of 
future negotiations.  
Andrei Lankov proposes the idea of international student exchange to give the 
DPRK a different perspective in politics, economy, and social ideologies of different 
states.234 Realistically, the DPRK would not send a contingent to the United States 
because it goes against its ideology, but the United States can work with international 
partners in holding exchanges among its allies. Lankov cites that the old Soviet regime 
partnered with the United States in sending four delegates on a one-year student 
exchange program to Columbia University.235 Two of the four students ended up being 
spy agency operatives, but the other two ended up being government elites who help to 
topple the communist regime.236 
The ROK has the most to lose if the DPRK regime implodes. The estimated cost 
for the ROK to absorb the DPRK ranges from $0.2 trillion to $5 trillion.237 Polls suggest 
that the majority of ROK citizens are proponents of a reunification in the future, however, 
economically, it would be in their best interests to provide partial support in the means of 
food donation and administrating SEZs such as the Kaesong Industrial Complex. 
Although the ROK’s current administration of President Park Geun-hye warns any 
initiation in armed conflict would result in retaliation from the ROK military, it still 
provides aid in the form of grain and trade benefits to its neighbor.238 The ROK would 
welcome the idea of an economic reform to bring legitimacy to the DPRK government, 
not only because it would be a path for the DPRK to become a law-abiding neighbor, but 
also it just makes political and economic sense to provide financial aid.  
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Although, the U.S. has already been down the road of providing financial 
assistance to the DPRK, it would still maintain the current policy if the DPRK proposes 
to stop its tyrannical behavior. The current U.S. policy change in pivoting to the Pacific 
will mean dealing head to head with China’s rising political and economic power. The 
U.S. would welcome a positive change by the DPRK because that has the possibility of 
bringing the DPRK buffer zone just that much closer to the ROK.  
B. FINDINGS 
Many successful states in history have implemented and emulated productive 
economic models. Both the ROK and Taiwan blossomed into economic powerhouses by 
implementing and emulating Japan’s successful economic model. Not all the models are 
created equal, however. Just because one model was successful does not mean that any 
state that follows that model will eventually become prosperous. The logic is to find the 
most similar model compared with the DPRK’s current standing and predict the results 
based on the high probably of the ROK’s and Taiwan’s past and current successes. The 
other twist to the DPRK’s potential economic reform policy is how to deal with the non-
elites in transitioning into a market economy that goes against their founding values and 
ideology. This is where China’s model comes into play. The irony of China’s economic 
success is how it was able to transition from a socialistic ideology into a market-driven 
economy with few bumps along the road. The Chinese politburo was able to implement 
changes to its policies in a gradual fashion to push its way through obstacles. The longer 
the DPRK keeps its current policies, the more difficult it will be to come out of the dark 
hole, but China’s model gives hope for the DPRK to slowly transition into a market-
driven economy and maintain order among the non-elites.  
Whether or not the DPRK decides to implement major economic policy changes 
is unclear. What is known is that the DPRK has the realistic potential to succeed if it 
decides to fully engage in the pursuit of economic growth. First, the new leadership is 
motivated to bring positive changes to the state in terms of economic reform. Second, 
advancement in nuclear technology will help the DPRK to write its own terms, whereas 
any negotiation goes with the international community in the event that the DPRK 
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foregoes is nuclear program in exchange for financial support. Third, SEZs can result in 
successful ventures if the DPRK decides to appoint expert management in guiding the 
existing SEZs in the right direction. Fourth, China will likely support most ventures of 
the DPRK, including economic reforms that will maintain the DPRK’s existence on the 
border of China. Fifth, the DPRK’s abundance of natural resources will place the state in 
a great position to trade with the international community with great terms. Last, the 
DPRK has to utilize its comparative advantage in human capital to the maximum extent 
to fully capture its true potential. 
C. WHAT THE FUTURE HOLDS 
The DPRK’s weak spot, which can jeopardize its existence in the near future, is 
its childlike behavior. In the past, the DPRK has fueled international communities’ anger 
with acts of terrorism that defied logic. For example, in retaliation to the ROK for 
holding the 1988 Summer Olympics in Seoul, the DPRK set off a bomb in 1987 on a 
Korean Air Flight, 858 killing 115 people.
239
 The DPRK also fired a torpedo, sinking the 
Cheonan and killing 46 ROK sailors. Investigators found parts of the torpedo showing 
clear evidence that the DPRK was involved with the tragedy.
240
 Finally, in November 
2010, the DPRK fired more than 100 artillery shells at the Yeonpyeong Islands, killing 
two and wounding 13. The ROK only retaliated with 80 rounds of warning fire and 
dispatched its fighter jets.
241
 The ROK public was not satisfied with the government’s 
response to the unprovoked attacks. Some of these efforts were to prop up Kim Jung-un’s 
legitimacy as the incoming leader. Up to now, the ROK has been very patient by not 
retaliating with vengeance. A concern would be that the ultraconservative president (Park 
Geun-hye) and the ROK citizens are at the end of their patience; one major act of 
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terrorism against the ROK could ignite a catastrophic event. At that point, the DPRK 
would lose even the trust of China, which is the DPRK’s number one source of economic 
assistance. The recent heightened tension in early 2013 has died down and it would be in 
the DPRK’s best interest for long-term survivability to refrain from acts of terrorism. But 
it does not preclude the DPRK from advancing its nuclear capability and backing away 
from future negotiation deals, which are minor infractions in the eyes of the international 
community compared with acts of terrorism. 
The recent assassination of the number two (Jang Song-taek) head of the DPRK 
throws a twist into the proposed economic policy reforms. Kim Jong-un’s ascendency to 
power has shifted from prior arrangements made by his father. For the past two years, 
Kim Jong-un has shifted power from the military to the Worker’s Party with the power of 
Jang, who had helped to purge military elites during Kim’s transition.242 Jang had been 
Kim’s mentor and had supported the economic reforms with his ties to China. Now, with 
Kim in full power by eliminating his right-hand man, the power has shifted back to the 
military.243 The future of economic policy reforms are still possible, but have hit a 
roadblock with the execution of Kim’s uncle. 
All in all, the DPRK controls its destiny. It will stumble through the next 15 to 20 
years, as proven by its existence through the past 60 years of trials and tribulations. As 
long as it maintains the same mixture of ideology and adds economic reforms, the 
international community will support the DPRK’s existence because of self-motivated 
interests. It is vital that the DPRK does not test the ROK’s patience because one wrong 
move could set off a time bomb—that time bomb could eventually wipe away all of the 
DPRK’s gains because the ROK will have the support of the United States and eventually 
the Chinese over any unprovoked military actions. 
                                                 
242 Jethro Mullen, “North Korea’s Kim lauds the purge of executed uncle Jang Song Thaek,” CNN, 
January 1 2014, http://www.cnn.com/2013/12/31/world/asia/north-korea-kim-jong-un-speech/index.html. 
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D. FINAL THOUGHTS 
This research about the DPRK has been a fascinating experience. The DPRK is 
not like any other country. The regime has placed itself in a situation where there are very 
few options to ever return to a legitimate state. I am in no situation to be able to predict 
what will happen to the DPRK, but I can base my opinion on several assumptions and 
empirical evidence in which path the DPRK can likely end up based on certain policy 
changes. The regime stability is anyone’s guess, especially with the recent execution of 
the second highest ranking official in the DPRK. If the regime desires to exercise those 
few options on its way to becoming a legitimate state, I would hope the policy changes 
result in success for the sake of the non-elites within the state who have suffered the most 
from the political motives of the Kim regime. Last, the initial phase of the Iranian nuclear 
deal with the international community gives me hope that the DPRK will follow in the 
Iranian footsteps in dismantling its nuclear program once and for all and welcome 
international economic support to the road to becoming a legitimate state. 
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